This paper argues that the rate of intangible investment -investment in the development and marketing of new products -accelerated in the wake of the electronics revolution in the 1970s.
WHAT IS THE US GROSS INVESTMENT IN INTANGIBLES? (AT LEAST) ONE TRILLION DOLLARS A YEAR!
This paper, part of a project on the empirical importance of creative destruction, attempts a preliminary estimate of the US investment in intangible assets. I argue that the rate of investment in intangibles, and its economic value, accelerated significantly beginning around 1980. Currently, I estimate that US private gross investment in intangibles is at least $1 trillion.
For historical reasons, much of this US investment in intangibles still remains uncounted. Both in US generally accepted accounting principles, and in US national income accounting dating at least back to Kuznets, investment in intangibles has been expensed, that is, treated as an intermediate input consumed in producing current output rather than as investment that produces a long-lived asset.
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In 1999, the national income accountants at the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) began the process of counting intangibles as investment by including software in its measures of business investment. Gross business investment in software is already over $180 billion, so US measured gross domestic product is nearly 2 percent higher than it would be if intangibles weren't counted at all.
An intangibles investment rate of $1 trillion suggests that US businesses are investing nearly as much in intangibles as they are in plant and equipment (business investment in fixed nonresidential plant and equipment in 2000 was $1.1 trillion). It also suggests that a third of the value of US corporate assets are intangibles, an estimate I document in part three. That means that the economics of creative destruction --also known less colorfully as endogenous growth --are rapidly becoming as important as the economics of the invisible hand (Nakamura, 2000.) These estimates are of the same general magnitude as those in Hall (1999) and McGrattan and Prescott (2001) .
What are intangibles? In this paper, I will define intangible investment as private expenditures on assets that are intangible and necessary to the creation and sale of new or improved products and processes. These include designs, software, blueprints, ideas, artistic expressions, recipes, and the like. They also include the testing and marketing of new products that are a necessary sunk cost of their first sale to customers. It is the private expense to create private rights to sell new products. If US businesses are employing substantial resources to create these rights, it should be possible to discern the impact of these investments in various facets of the economy. If not, then perhaps the omission is unimportant.
Each of my estimates for intangible investment is based on incomplete data, but all of them point to an estimate that is at least half a trillion dollars, and almost assuredly twice that amount. My methodology is to attempt to capture estimates from three separate aspects of intangible investing: expenditures (how much users pay for investments), labor inputs (what workers' occupations are and how much they are being paid), and corporate operating margins (as viewed through their tax accounts and their public financial reports).
Specifically, the first estimate is based on the expenditures of those that use intangibles in production: the National Science Foundation's data on industrial expenditures on research and development, the US BEA's estimates of software 1 For a discussion of the intellectual history of output classification, see Hill (1999) . investment, and McCann-Erickson's estimates of expenditures on advertising media. These together were 6 percent the size of US GDP in 2000.
The second estimate is based on inputs that are identifiable as contributing to the production of intangibles. I use occupational statistics to determine the proportion of labor income going to workers whose occupations are creative -engineers, scientists, writers, artists, etc. These are estimated below to represent 9.9 percent of payrolls in 2000, using data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Current Population Statistics on full-time workers and the median pay they receive.
The third estimate is based on operating margins. If firms are spending a substantial amount on intangibles, and have been doing so for some years, the successes of this expenditure should permit firms on average to increase markups. This can be estimated using corporate expense statements, as a shift of expenditures away from direct production costs that Compustat and the US Treasury's Statistics of Income label "cost of goods sold," to research and development, and administrative, marketing and general expenses. These series show that cost of goods sold, relative to revenues, fell about 10 percentage points after 1980.
All these estimates suggest strongly, if imprecisely, that at least 6 percent to 10 percent of US GDP is spent annually on intangibles, and possibly substantially more. It turns out that it is possible to use an indirect method to arrive at a surprisingly precise lower bound on the gross investment in intangibles. The ratio of consumption to true gross domestic product, including both tangible and intangible investment, should be relatively stable. If so, then the rise in the ratio of consumption to measured gross domestic product will provide a relatively precise estimate of the increase in unmeasured intangible investment. This ratio suggests that unmeasured intangible investment was $910 billion in 2000, with a 5 percent confidence interval of plus or minus $200 billion.
Adding in the $230 billion in software investment that was measured in that year, we arrive at a lower bound estimate of US gross investment in intangibles of $1.1 trillion.
This estimate is a lower bound in that it measures the increase in investment in intangibles after 1977.
If we are investing $1 trillion a year in intangibles, and if the obsolescence rate for intangibles is no more than 16 percent annually, then the long-run equilibrium value of intangibles is $6 trillion. Although we have not reached the long-run equilibrium, we can use the expenditure paths derived above to show that the current equilibrium value is most likely over $5 trillion. In the bear market valuation of US domestic equities at the end of the first quarter of 2001, the market valuation of all US stocks was roughly $13 trillion. Thus, intangibles could represent a third or more of the market value of US domestic corporations.
Why has this change suddenly swept over the US economy? Because of the electronics revolution of the 1970s, which raised the return to investing in intangibles. A series of papers, including one by Jeremy Greenwood and Boyan Jovanovic (1999) , have argued that the US stock market equity decline in the mid-1970s, and its subsequent rise beginning in the 1980s, were both consequences of the electronics revolution. One aspect of the electronics revolution is presented below: I argue that it made intangible investment much more remunerative. In particular, what electronics have done is reduce the cost of reaching and staying in touch with customers, making it easier and more profitable to bring new products to market. I use theory developed by Chandler (1980 Chandler ( , 1994 and Stein (1997) to argue that innovators became able to reap a larger share of the rewards of innovation in the wake of the electronics revolution.
Let me stress that national income accountants are well aware of the growing role of intangibles and have already begun to take steps toward measuring investment in intangibles; this effort to capture intangibles has been led by statisticians at the OECD (1998). One of the justifications for the new industrial classification system, NAICS, is getting a better handle on industries, such as the arts, that depend heavily on intangible asset formation. And as I have mentioned, in the 1999 revision to the US national accounts the BEA added the first intangible investment, investment in software, to its measure of US gross domestic product.
I begin with the theory and evidence for the dramatic changes of the 1970s before turning to my empirical estimates.
Part One: The coming of the New Economy: The impact of electronics on customer bases in the 1970s
As Alfred Chandler (1980 Chandler ( , 1994 (Nakamura, 2001) , the sales and clerical staff, which had grown at least as fast as other managerial and professional staff from 1900 to 1975, began to shrink as a proportion of the workforce beginning in 1980. The relative decline in sales and clerical staff is a key indicator of the obsolescence of the corporate investment in sales and communication.
In the process, corporations became far more vulnerable to innovation than they had been. As Greenwood and Jovanovic (1999) Beginning in the 1980s, the market valuation of individual firms, as documented by Campbell et al. (2001) , became more idiosyncratically volatile. While this effect may also be explained, as they tentatively argue, by firms becoming deconglomerated and more focused in their product lines (so that firms' idiosyncratic variations are less internally hedged ) and by the institutionalization of equity ownership (tending to concentrate and sharpen the impacts of differences in opinion), both these arguments are complementary to the view that corporate value became riskier because of the increased importance and economic force of innovative activity and intangible assets. It is worth noting that they also find that the total market volatility (over the period 1962 to 1997) if anything decreased.
An interesting parallel development is that also beginning in the late 1970s, the rate of dividend payment by firms began to fall. As Fama and French (2000) show, in 1978, 66.6 percent of publicly traded nonfinancial nonutility firms paid dividends. In 1999, only 20.8 percent of such firms paid dividends. Firms that have never paid dividends tend to be less profitable, have more growth opportunities, invest at a higher rate, do more R&D, and have higher ratios of market value to book value than firms that pay dividends. (They are also much smaller, so that, in fact, the ratio of total dividends paid to GDP has risen for US firms.) To put it briefly, these nondividend-paying firms are firms that have made and are making large investments in intangible assets. Because these investments are risky and illiquid, the firms making them tend to face relatively high outside financing costs and, thus, should rationally be more reluctant to issue dividends. 4 The rise of these firms with their substantial investments in intangibles thus favored capital gains relative to dividends.
There are, of course, other rationales for firms not to pay dividends, such as their double taxation, and the various tax advantages of capital gains. (However, it is not the case that firms that don't pay dividends have shifted to share buybacks; rather Fama and French show that share buybacks are done by firms that also pay dividends.)
To summarize, I have argued that the electronics revolution in the 1970s caused existing corporate customer bases to become less valuable, innovative activity more profitable, corporate valuation riskier, dividends less important, and capital gains larger.
large economies of scale, following a power law in costs.
Part Two: Estimates of gross investment in intangible assets

Direct estimates of expenditures on intangibles. According to National Science
Foundation estimates, in 2000, US corporations spent $181 billion of their own funds on research and development. This represented 3.3 percent of the gross domestic product of nonfinancial corporations, and 1.8 percent of total gross domestic product (Table 1 ). In 1978, R&D expenditures were 1.8 percent of nonfinancial corporate GDP and 1 percent of aggregate GDP.
It is important for two reasons to use nominal data in this comparison. First, the proportion of economic resources devoted to investment is best measured in terms of the opportunity cost. This implies using an aggregate deflator like a wage deflator (Keynes, 1936) or the GDP deflator, or a comparison with other nominal magnitudes, such as the ratio between intangible expenditures and GDP, which is the measure I have chosen.
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Second, the nominal value of the financial asset created in equilibrium by a given investment equals the nominal value of the expense.
In 2000, according to the BEA, private businesses invested $183 billion in software, 1.8 percent of GDP, compared to 0.3 percent in 1978. Of this, $61 billion was for prepackaged software, $57 billion for custom software, and $64 billion for software made for internal use (own account). For own account software, and for some custom software, the intellectual asset is bundled with the investment. But for prepackaged software, the investment is made by the purchaser, but the intellectual property rights to the software remain with the seller. 
Evidence on wages and salaries in occupations associated with creativity.
Professional specialty workers in the US economy have been growing as a proportion of the total. A large part of this group is workers who are typically associated with creativity and with innovation: engineers, architects, natural scientists, mathematicians and computer scientists, artists, writers, and entertainers. As a fraction of the workforce, this group has been expanding rapidly. Table 2 , which mixes data from the Census of Population and the Current Population Survey, shows that the proportion of workers in these creative professions has risen from 3.8 percent in 1980 to 5.8 percent in 2000.
We can also use data from the Current Population Survey to estimate the proportion of total US wages and salaries these workers represent. Detailed data on median weekly earnings of full-time employees are published annually in Employment and Earnings; total earnings can be estimated by multiplying the median weekly earnings by the number of full-time workers in each category. If we do this, we can estimate that in 2000, creative professionals were paid 9.9 percent of US wages and salaries, as their median earnings were, on average, 1.6 times the median for the entire workforce (Table   3 ). In contrast, 17 years earlier, in 1983, creative professionals were paid 7.5 percent of US wages and salaries. If creative workers represent nearly 10 percent of wages and salaries, it would appear that estimating that 10 percent of US output is for intangibles is low and that 15 percent might not be out of the question.
During the same period, service professionals -teachers, doctors, nurses, and lawyers, for the most part -grew from 10.3 percent to 13.1 percent of payrolls, and executives and managerial professionals grew from 16.1 percent to 21.4 percent of payrolls. Some increasing part of these workers is also working to help create, test, and market intangible assets. For example, college teachers write textbooks, do research, set up web sites, and, increasingly, start companies to capitalize on their intangible investments. Doctors, in rapidly increasing numbers, perform research for drug companies and develop diagnostic, surgical, and therapeutic tools. For example, according to the Association of University Technology Managers Licensing Survey, universities and hospitals in the US earned nearly $800 million in licensing fees in the academic year 1998-99.
The median pay statistics suggest that payments to creative workers rose roughly a third from 1983 to 2000, as a proportion of the total. This is a distinctly slower pace of growth than for the direct estimate of gross investment in intangibles, which rose by about four-fifths in proportion to gross domestic product in the same period.
One reason that we might see a slower pace of growth in the payroll data is that the measure we use to capture average wages is the median, rather than the mean.
Inequality has likely been rising in these categories, as it has in other wage measures, during this period. This will generally cause the mean to rise more rapidly than the median (although it will do so for the total as well Another view of this is provided in Figure 3 . Here I have organized the estimated wages and salaries of occupational groups into three categories: One is production workers, that is, those who produce goods and services, including service professionals such as doctors and teachers. The second is sales and clerical workers, and the third is managers and creative professionals. From 1983 to 2000, total wages and salaries of production workers and clerical and sales workers have grown just about in parallel, 5.1 percent annually and 5.2 percent annually, respectively. During that same period, wages and salaries of managers and creative professionals have risen at an annual rate of 7.3 percent.
Put another way, for every dollar spent on production workers and clerical and sales workers in 1983, 38 cents was being spent on managers and creative professionals.
In 2000, 54 cents per dollar was being spent on managers and creative professionals. If we can attribute the increase in this ratio to intangible investment, then intangibles would account for 11 percent of employment expenditures.
Cost of goods sold.
If there has been an accelerated expenditure on intangibles arising in research and development, marketing, and administrative expenses, and these expenditures have resulted in corporations' gaining market power in the form of unique assets such as copyrights, patents, and brand names, then margins should be rising. As I have argued elsewhere (Nakamura, 1999b) , the rise in margins may not show up fully as an increase in profitability because the intangible expense itself will also be rising, thus canceling out some of the improvement in profits.
What we should observe is that direct operating costs should decline substantially as a proportion of revenues, and expenses should shift toward research and development, marketing, and administrative expenses. We have documented the shift toward the latter.
Do we also see the former?
A standard measure of operating costs is cost of goods sold; this is materials costs, leasing costs, and production payroll costs. For all corporations, cost of sales and operations rose from $4.2 trillion in 1980, according to the US Treasury's Statistics on Income (based on corporate taxes) to $9.1 trillion in 1997. As a proportion of receipts, this is a decline from 66.1 percent to 54.9 percent (Table 4) This measure is subject to many problems, since it includes double counting. Moreover, corporations may change the way they separate cost of sales from administrative and other expenses, depending on how they define their product. For example, several large corporations, including General Electric, have redefined themselves as service corporations or conglomerates, and no longer publish cost of goods sold on the same basis. Businesses that receive contract or royalty payments for creative activities like design or invention will tend to include many creative expenses as part of "cost of operations." But shifts in expenses have been so large that with all of these problems, cost of goods should fall substantially as a proportion of corporate receipts, and that is what we observe. Indeed, a decline in cost of goods sold of about 10 percent of 7 Vertical integration will tend to lower double counting. Also, energy costs are repeatedly counted in cost of sales, so the decline in energy costs during this period would also tend to lower cost of sales.
revenues is about what we should expect if intangible investment has reached 10 percent of output: by 2000, we were approaching that amount.
A relatively precise indirect estimate of gross investment in intangibles.
Investment in intangibles can be viewed as an alternative to investing in tangibles, in that it enables us to derive more utility from production for our variable inputs, the same effect a higher capital stock might achieve. If this is so, it is a natural conclusion of endogenous growth theory that the ratio of consumption to measured input should rise when investment in intangibles becomes more fruitful. If there has been a sudden acceleration in the rate of intangible investment, as I argue, then it is plausible that this should show up in a rise in the ratio of consumption to gross domestic product, if we do not fully include investment in intangibles in our measure of gross domestic product.
Another way to think of this is to suppose the contrary. One of the more robust predictions of modern exogenous growth theory is that consumption should be a relatively stable share of gross domestic product, and gross investment in intangibles should be unimportant, because exogenous growth theory sees growth as occurring without investment in innovation. This conclusion can be drawn from a growth model that assumes a constant savings rate, as Solow (1956) does or an optimal growth path as Ramsey (1928) does. The main requirement is that the depreciation rate remain steady.
The rise in the ratio of consumption to gross domestic product is, of course, closely related to the decline in the personal savings rate. But the conclusion that consumption should be stable relative to gross domestic product is more robust in theory and empirically than the conclusion that the measured personal savings rate should remain steady (Friedman, 1957) , as under Ricardian equivalence intertemporal changes in taxes, for example, will affect the measured personal savings rate, although they do not affect the ratio of consumption to GDP. 8 Moreover, the standard deviation of the latter is more stable for the period 1953 to 1978; the standard deviation of the savings rate is 1.0 percent, compared to the ratio of personal consumption expenditures to gross domestic product, 0.6 percent, using quarterly data. Indeed, the theories of growth that can be used to determine general equilibrium values of corporate capital stock typically have as a testable sub-hypothesis that the ratio of consumption to GDP is constant.
To summarize, if an important amount of investment in intangibles began to occur in the 1980s, as our direct measures have suggested, then the ratio of consumption to gross domestic product should have risen, since the gross investment in intangibles was not captured.
If we assume that the gross savings rate is constant over time, as is compatible with some theories of growth, then we can go further and say that changes in the ratio reflect changes in unmeasured gross domestic product. If we can further argue, as I have, that the source of mismeasurement is investment in intangibles, then the proportion by which the consumption-gross domestic product ratio has risen is the increase of the gross investment in intangibles as a proportion of measured gross domestic product. If the ratio has risen by 9.1 percent, as we shall show, then the increase in gross investment in intangibles is 9.1 percent of gross domestic product.
Another advantage of this measure is that it is for the most part a ratio of directly observed quantities, except, of course, for the omission of gross intangible investment from the denominator. The components of both are estimated from the same side of the national income statement, the expenditures side. And the largest imputed quantity in expenditures, the imputation for household consumption of owner-occupied housing services, is slow-moving and appears in both the numerator and the denominator, so mismeasurement effects will be second order. A final advantage is that it can be measured in a way that is insensitive to deflation issues, as both the numerator and the denominator can be deflated with the GDP deflator, which is the same as using their nominal ratios. Figure 5 shows that from the early 1950s through the late 1970s, the ratio of consumption to GDP was indeed stable. During this period, the average ratio of personal consumption expenditures to gross domestic product in the United States was 62.2 percent, with a standard deviation (measured on an annual basis) of 0.67 percentage point. 9 Thus the central tendency is quite precisely estimated. Throughout the period, the ratio never goes higher than 63.1 percent or lower than 61.0 percent. It is perhaps worth noting that during this period the ratio is modestly countercyclical, rising in recessions, as the permanent income hypothesis would suggest.
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If consumers treat gross intangible investment as they would gross tangible investment, the increase in the ratio of consumption to gross national product should be an estimate of the ratio of increased unmeasured intangible investment to output. Indeed, Moreover, if we believe that gross investment in intangibles has grown relatively smoothly as a proportion of gross domestic product, it would appear that the ratio of consumption to true gross domestic product has remained relatively constant ( Figure 6 ). In an economy of the type we have described in which giant corporations no longer can dominate industries, all products are subject to replacement by new, superior innovations. This is the heart of Schumpeter's model of creative destruction.
Suppose we extended q theory to intangible assets, via a model of quality ladders, to estimate the stock market value of intangibles using data on gross investments. The model of Grossman and Helpman (1991) In any model of this type, if we can estimate the rate of obsolescence, ι, and the rate of gross investment in technology, a I ι, then we can determine the steady state stock market value of intangibles, a I .
Now it is unlikely that we are in a steady state, but the calculation will tell us whether the valuations that we have for the market are sustainable (on the extreme assumption that there is no organizational capital). I assume that the gross rate of investment in intangibles is 10 percent of GDP, or $1 trillion. I further assume that the rate of obsolescence is 16 percent, a conservative reading of the literature on research and development (see, for example, Nissim and Thomas, 2000, and Chambers et al., 1998) .
Then in steady state, the equilibrium stock market value of intangibles will be $6 trillion. The reasoning is straightforward. In steady state, the rate of obsolescence of intangible assets must equal the rate of their creation. The rate of creation is one-tenth of GDP, and that means that the stock market must lose, through obsolescence, exactly onetenth of GDP each year. If the stock market is losing 16 percent of its intangibles to obsolescence every year, in steady state the stock market value of intangibles must be 0.6 times GDP, or $6 trillion. Thus it would appear that if tangibles by themselves justify a $10 trillion stock market, as appears to be the case from Flow of Funds data, our current rate of gross investment in intangibles would justify, in steady state, a $16 trillion stock market.
The value of the stock market. Suppose there are no intangible investments, which is the basic assumption of exogenous growth theory. If markets are competitive, the current value of tangible investments net of debt will, in long-run equilibrium, equal the market value of equities, by the same reasoning just presented for intangibles. I have argued in this paper that data on corporate expenses, occupational wages and salaries, personal consumption expenditures, and stock market valuations are more consistent with the notion that US gross investment in intangibles in 2000 was nearer $1 trillion than zero. Indeed, the data are surprisingly consistent with a US gross investment in intangibles that is at least $1.1 trillion.
The pace of change of the US economy is likely to continue to be rapid, even if the pace of growth of gross investment in intangibles is not as fast in the future as it has been in the past 20 years. This will likely keep stock market equity valuations rising at a strong clip. An important question is whether we should expect equity valuation to be permanently above the stock of intangibles, that is, whether there is an important amount of "organizational capital" in the economy. If there is, the equilibrium stock market value of the economy may be higher than estimates herein suggest. 2.5% 1 9 5 9 1 9 6 1 1 9 6 3 1 9 6 5 1 9 6 7 1 9 6 9 1 9 7 1 1 9 7 3 1 9 7 5 1 9 7 7 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 9 1 9 6 1 1 9 6 3 1 9 6 5 1 9 6 7 1 9 6 9 1 9 7 1 1 9 7 3 1 9 7 5 1 9 7 7 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 9 directly measured intangibles R&D, software, half of advt preferred measure 60 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Trillions of dollars 
